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attraction was a desire for action and a willingness to take chances. Working
together, the three gradually developed and executed the strategy that led to
the capture of Vicksburg and the closing of the river to the Confederacy.
One of Hearn's most striking observations concerns similarities between
Porter and the political general Benjamin F. Butler that were revealed when
the two leaders were assigned to cooperate in the capture of Fort Fisher at the
mouth of the Cape Fear River. Both men were, Hearn notes, "intellectually
gifted and independent thinkers whose talent for innovation ranged from the
brilliant to the absurd" (p. 274). The two worked well together until the time
came to carry through with their plans. Then Porter's push for action conflicted with Butler's sluggishness and brought them to a parting of the ways.
Butler's successor in the Fort Fisher operation, Major General Alfred H.
Terry, was one of the few volunteer officers for whom Porter retained respect
after service together. The key was a willingness to fight.
Porter's career during the Civil War was brilliant. His rise from lieutenant
to rear admiral paralleled that of George A. Custer, but Porter's role was of
much greater importance. Unlike the army, which had to contend with Reconstruction and pacifying the frontier, the navy had no clear mission following the war, and the remainder of Porter's career lacked the excitement of his
younger days. His service as head of the naval academy and his involvement
in bureaucratic maneuvers regarding the role of the navy are of interest only
to specialists, and Hearn wisely offers only a brief summary of Porter's last
years.
Hearn is careful in the claims that he makes for Porter's importance and
takes note of his flaws. The research is solid, and the book is quite readable.
The maps have been copied from Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel's
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York, 1887-88) and the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (30
vols.; Washington, D.C., 1894-1922) and could be improved. Otherwise, this
is a fine volume and probably the last biography of David Dixon Porter that
we will need for some time to come.
Tarleton State University
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Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman and Johnston. By Nathaniel Cheairs
Hughes Jr. Civil War America. (Chapel Hill and London: University of
North Carolina Press, c. 1996. pp. xxii, 336. $37.50, ISBN 0-8078-2281-7.)
Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. has probably written the definitive work
on the battle of Bentonville, the final battle between Confederate General
Joseph E. Johnston and Union General William T. Sherman. This engagement
was the conclusion of the long process of Sherman's invasion of the South,
which began at Atlanta in June 1864, moved to Savannah, and through the
Carolinas.
For those individuals who like to follow the development of a battle regiment by regiment, this is the book to read since the author details in an easily followed manner the placement of troops over the three-day period of
March 19 through 21, 1865. One almost experiences the trauma of the battle
and participates in the decisions made by the leading generals.
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But Hughes does more than that-he places the battle in the context of the
closing days of the Confederacy. Brief biographical vignettes of the major
participants help the reader to understand not only what expertise and knowledge the generals brought to the battle but also what inadequacies and personal antagonisms existed among the leadership. The final chapter adequately analyzes the motivations and qualifications of the leading generals on both
sides and evaluates their tactics, successful or not. Those generals who do not
come off well are Braxton Bragg, William P. Carlin, Jefferson C. Davis, and
Lafayette McLaws.
It is Hughes's contention that Sherman's main objective was to occupy
Goldsboro, north of the Neuse River, unite with Generals John M. Schofield
and Alfred H. Terry from the East, and assist Ulysses S. Grant against Robert
E. Lee in Virginia. Therefore, Sherman underestimated the forces under
Johnston, did not believe he would attack, and considered Johnston to be a
mere nuisance in his march northward. With Goldsboro on his mind, Sherman exposed the left wing of his army, which was then open to attack by an
entrenched Johnston. On the other hand, Johnston thought that he could take
on Sherman's left wing and, even against great odds, cripple the rest of Sherman's army. Besides, Johnston needed to prove that the Army of Tennessee
was capable of successfully taking the offensive, in spite of the history of this
army in the West.
The book is well illustrated and has a series of maps that help the reader
follow the action. One is still confused, however, about the location of Black
River and Black Creek and other minor sites; knowledge of those positions
would have been helpful in understanding the engagement. The appendix includes the military organization of the forces on both sides as well as vignettes explaining what happened to key officers after Bentonville. The book
is adequately documented with eighty pages of notes and bibliography.
Questions still linger, however, as to why Johnston thought he could stop
Sherman, and why Johnston allowed his army to remain on the field on the
second and third days in spite of the odds against it, and, even yet, why Sherman did not use his superior forces to drive Johnston from the field on March
21? There are no adequate answers, and Hughes offers none, except to use
the metaphor that Bentonville represented the Confederacy itself, "bright
hopes drowned in dark swamp water" (p. 231). To Hughes, Sherman's failure
to press the fight was "the capstone of his magnificent Carolina Campaign"
(p. 230), and for Johnston, Bentonville represented an opportunity for "inspired military leadership" that failed.
An alternative view with more personal interest stories and details of Sherman's advance through the Carolinas preceding Bentonville is presented by
Mark L. Bradley in Last Stand in the Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville
(Campbell, Calif., 1996).
Liberty University
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Sherman's Horsemen: Union Cavalry Operations in the Atlanta Campaign.
By David Evans. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, c. 1996. Pp. xxxviii, 645. $40.00, ISBN 0-253-32963-9.)

